Piccione and Rubinstein have pointed out ambiguities in the interpretation of games of imperfect recall. They focus on the notion of time consistency, and argue that a player in a game of imperfect recall may be time inconsistent, changing his strategy despite no new information and no change in his preferences. In this paper, it is argued that the apparent time inconsistency arises from implicit assumptions made in the de nition about what the driver knows when he reconsiders his strategy and what he will remember if he changes his strategy, and about how the node at which reconsideration takes place is chosen. A model is proposed, based on earlier work in the computer science literature, that allows us|indeed, almost forces us|to make these issues explicit. Once these issues are made explicit, time inconsistency seems less inconsistent.
Introduction
In an early version of their fascinating paper, Piccione and Rubinstein 1997] (PR from now on) argue that \the model of extensive games with imperfect recall su ers from major ambiguities". They go on to say that \the di culty in interpreting the model stems from questions concerning the knowledge described by the information partition and the restrictions that the information structure imposes on the set of strategies". To illustrate this issue, PR focus on time consistency: that is, the question of whether a player will want to change his strategy in the midst of playing a game. One of their primary examples is what they call the \absentminded driver paradox", which they describe as follows: Example 1.1: An individual is sitting late at night in a bar planning his midnight trip home. In order to get home he has to take the highway and get o at the second exit. Turning at the rst exit leads into a disastrous area (payo 0). Turning at the second exit yields the highest reward (payo 4). If he continues beyond the second exit he will reach the end of the highway and nd a hotel where he can spend the night (payo 1). The driver is absentminded and is aware of this fact. When reaching an intersection he cannot tell whether it is the rst or the second intersection and he cannot remember how many he has passed.
The situation is described by the game tree in Figure 1 . Clearly the only decision the driver has to make is whether to get o when he reaches an exit. He cannot plan on doing di erent things at each exit, since, by assumption, he does not know which exit he is at when he reaches an exit. Suppose we start by considering deterministic strategies. In this case, while sitting at the bar, there is one obviously best option: not to exit. For in this case, the driver will certainly reach the end of the highway, which has payo 1. On the other hand, if the driver decides to get o when he reaches an exit, then he will do so at the rst exit, which has payo 0. This is the driver's reasoning at time 0, while still in the bar. Now consider what happens when he reaches the rst exit. Suppose that the driver remembers the strategy he chose at the bar. Since this strategy prescribes not exiting, he should, according to PR, ascribe subjective probability 1=2 to being at the rst exit. Subjectively, he is equally likely to be at either exit. He thus concludes that it is optimal to get o , since the expected payo of doing so is 2. This gives us time inconsistency: despite no new information and no change in his preferences, the driver is tempted to change his initial plan once he reaches an exit. PR go on to show that a similar time inconsistency arises even if the driver uses his optimal randomized (behavioral) strategy. (Their argument is reviewed in Section 3.) This certainly seems paradoxical! At a high level, I agree completely with PR's claim that there are ambiguities in the standard approach to modeling of games of imperfect recall and, in particular, to modeling the knowledge of agents in such games. Moreover, I agree with their implicit claim that it is these ambiguities that lead to the apparently counterintuitive nature of the absentminded driver example. The goal of this paper is to try to make the ambiguities more explicit, and to propose a modeling methodology that helps us to avoid them.
I argue that in order to analyze this example (and time consistency in general), we must be very careful to specify (1) exactly what the driver knows and remembers (in particular, whether he knows his initial strategy and whether he will remember his new strategy if he switches), and (2) what causes the agent to reconsider. (Does the agent reconsider at just one node, or at every node in the information set? If it is just one node, how is that node chosen?)
The critical role of what the driver knows and remembers is perhaps best seen by considering the game described in Figure 2 (this is PR's Example 2). It is not hard to show that the strategy that maximizes expected utility chooses action S at node x 1 , action B at node x 2 , and action R at the information set X consisting of x 3 and x 4 . Call this strategy f. Let f 0 be the strategy of choosing action B at x 1 , action S at x 2 , and L at X. PR argue that if node x 1 is reached, the agent should reconsider, and decide to switch from f to f 0 . If the agent is able to remember that he switched strategies, then this is correct; the agent is indeed better o (under any reasonable notion of \better o ") if he switches. The reason for the time inconsistency here is that an agent's strategy must dictate the same action at nodes x 3 and x 4 , since they are in the same information set. Intuitively, since the agent cannot distinguish the nodes, he must do the same thing at both. If the agent had perfect recall, he could distinguish the nodes. In this case, the optimal strategy would essentially look like the result of switching from f to f 0 at x 1 without perfect recall: the agent plays L at x 3 (as he would with f 0 ) and R at x 4 (as he would with f). Switching strategies ends up simulating the optimal strategy here because, by having the ability to switch strategies and remember that he has switched, the agent is able to simulate perfect recall. Among other things, PR explicitly assume \that the decision maker is not allowed to employ an external device to assist him in keeping the information which he would otherwise lose". However, allowing an agent to know his strategy may act as just such an external device.
As this example suggests, an information set in a game tree may not adequately represent the information that the agent actually has. As a consequence, the standard restriction that a strategy must behave the same way at all nodes in an information set may be inappropriate. Of course, a strategy must be such that an agent does the same thing in all situations that he cannot distinguish. The point is that \situations that he cannot distinguish" and \nodes in the same information set" may be two quite di erent notions. Roughly speaking, they coincide if the agent knows his strategy, never changes it, and has perfect recall. Otherwise, they may di er.
So how can we capture an agent's information? I propose a solution based on the multi-agent system framework introduced by Halpern and Fagin 1989 ]|and discussed in detail in Fagin, Halpern, Moses, and Vardi 1995] |and extended by Halpern and Tuttle 1993] to deal with randomized actions. The idea is to distinguish the \external world" from an agent's \internal world". The game tree is a useful representation of the external world. Nodes in a game tree can be viewed as describing possible states of the external world. Information sets then represent an upper bound on what the agent can know about the external world, even assuming that she has perfect recall. To represent an agent's internal world, I assume that the agent, like the external world, is always in some (local) state. Intuitively, this state describes all the relevant information the agent has|about the external world, about other agents (if there are other agents in the game), about her strategy, and so on. For example, as noted in Fagin, Halpern, Moses, and Vardi 1995] , to capture the fact that an agent knows her strategy, we can encode the strategy in the agent's local state. Similarly, to capture the fact that an agent remembers what actions she has performed thus far, these actions must be encoded in the agent's state. By making the agent's state explicit, there is no doubt about what the agent knows or does not know at any point.
The analogue to a strategy in this framework is a protocol, which is a function from local states to actions. Protocols are meant to capture the same intuitions as strategies: what an agent does can depend only on what he knows. But now, an agent's knowledge is captured, not by the information set, but by his local state. If the information sets characterize an agent's knowledge in a game, then protocols and strategies coincide. When they do not (as is the case in the two games discussed above), then I would argue that protocols are the right notion to consider, not strategies.
In the games of imperfect recall described in PR, what the agent's possible states are is left ambiguous. In the framework I present here, we are forced to be explicit about this. If we allow the agent to switch strategies, and the agent's state includes the last strategy chosen, the agent's local state will be di erent at nodes x 3 and x 4 in Figure 2 . Since the agent's protocol is a function of his local state, not his information set, a protocol may perform di erent actions at these nodes. The optimal protocol in this game is indeed to choose to change strategies at node x 1 (which results in di erent actions being performed at x 3 and x 4 ), and it is indeed time consistent.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, some basic de nitions are given (which are mainly standard de nitions of game theory). In Section 3, I take a closer look at the notion of time consistency, and consider four possible de nitions of it and the assumptions underlying them: the original PR notion of time consistency, PR's notion of modi ed multi-self time consistency (and Aumann, Hart, and Perry's 1997] equivalent notion of action optimality), and two new notions called gt and ms (multiself) consistency. As we shall see, the notions di er in important but subtle ways. In Section 4, I describe the multi-agent system framework and show how it can be used to capture information in games. In particular, I show that, given a game, each of the four notions of consistency gives rise to a particular system that captures in a precise sense the assumptions underlying the notion. I conclude with some discussion in Section 5. Proofs of some of the results can be found in the appendix.
Basic De nitions
A game ? is described by a game tree consisting of a nite collection of nodes partially ordered by (where is a transitive and anti-symmetric relation). As usual, we write x y if x y or x = y. Intuitively, x y if there is a path from x to y in the tree. Game trees are assumed to be rooted; that is, there is a unique node x 0 such that for all nodes y in ?, we have x 0 y. Finally, we assume that does de ne a tree, in that if x y and x 0 y, then we must have either x x 0 or x 0 x. For a k-player game, the nodes in a game tree can be partitioned into k + 2 sets denoted C, D 1 , : : : , D k , and Z. Since in this paper I want to focus on single-agent games, I henceforth assume that k = 1, and refer to D rather than D 1 . The set C consists of chance nodes, where nature moves. The edges coming out of nodes in C are labeled by the probability of nature taking that move. For example, in Figure 2 , x 0 is a chance node; nature moves from x 0 to x 1 with probability :5. The set D consists of decision nodes where the player must move. D is further partitioned into information sets. (The information sets are described by ellipses in the game tree.) For example, in Figure 1 , e 1 and e 2 are in the same information set. Intuitively, if two nodes are in the same information set, then the player cannot distinguish them. Exactly what \cannot distinguish" means is one of the major issues dealt with in this paper. At each node x in D, the player can choose among some set of actions, denoted A(x). The edges coming out of x are labeled by these actions. We assume that the same set of actions can be performed at each node in a given information set. That is, if x and y are both in information set X, then A(x) = A(y). For example, since e 1 and e 2 are both in information set X e in Figure 1 , we have A(e 1 ) = A(e 2 ) = fB; Eg. Thus, we can write A(X) to denote the actions that can be taken at an information set X. The set Z consists of the set of terminal nodes in ?; that is, those nodes z for which there does not exist z 0 such that z z 0 . With each node z 2 Z is associated a utility u(z); u(z) can be thought of as the payo for reaching node z. For example, in Figure 1 , u(z 1 ) = 0 and u(z 2 ) = 4.
Roughly speaking, an agent in game ? has perfect recall if he always remembers what actions he has taken and what he knew previously. Formally, this is captured by associating with each node x in the game tree the sequence exp(x) (for the experience of the agent at node x) of actions taken by the agent and information sets gone through by the agent in going from the root to x. For example, in Figure 1 , exp(e 2 ) = hX e ; B; X e i, while in Figure 2 , exp(x 3 ) = hfx 1 g; B; fx 3 ; x 4 gi. I omit the formal de nition here. A game of perfect recall is one where, for every information set X, we have exp(x) = exp(x 0 ) for all nodes x; x 0 2 X. Thus, the game in Figure 1 is not a game of perfect recall, since exp(e 1 ) 6 = exp(e 2 ). The game in Figure 2 is not a game of perfect recall either, since exp(x 3 ) 6 = exp(x 4 ).
We can similarly associate with each node x two other sequences, denoted exp 0 (x) and exp 00 (x). The sequence exp 0 (x) consists of the sequence of information sets gone through by the agent (but not the sequence of actions), while exp 00 (x) consists of the sequence of information sets without consecutive repetitions. Thus, for example, in Figure 1 , we have exp 0 (e 2 ) = hX e ; X e i, while exp 00 (e 2 ) = hX e i, with the second X e omitted. PR say a game ? has perfect recall of information sets if, for every information set X and x; x 0 2 X, we have exp 0 (x) = exp 0 (x 0 ). Similarly, I say that ? has partial recall (of information sets) if, for every information set X and x; x 0 2 X, we have exp 00 (x) = exp 00 (x 0 ). 1 Note that the absentminded driver example exhibits partial recall, although not perfect recall of information sets. The game in Figure 2 does not exhibit partial recall (and, a fortiori, does not exhibit perfect recall of information sets either).
PR say that a game exhibits absentmindedness if there is an information set X with two nodes x; x 0 2 X such that x x 0 . Clearly a game that exhibits absentmindedness cannot be a game of perfect recall. The absentminded driver example of Figure 1 is a game that exhibits absentmindedness. Intuitively, a behavior strategy speci es the action that an agent takes at each node x 2 D. We allow the choice of action to be randomized. Formally, a behavior strategy b assigns to each node x 2 D a probability distribution b(x) over the actions in A(x).
For notational convenience, this distribution is often denoted b x . (Of course, if b is deterministic, b x assigns probability 1 to some action in a 2 A(x); in this case, I write b(x) = a.) If nodes x and y are in the same information set X, we assume that b x = b y , since the agent is not supposed to be able to tell which of these nodes he is at. Thus, we can write b X to denote the distribution on the actions in A(X). We can think of b x as a random device (e.g., a coin toss) that is activated when node x is reached. For example, if at node x an agent has two possible actions, L and R, and b x (L) = :6, then at node x, the agent tosses a coin which lands heads with probability :6, and chooses action L if the coin lands heads, and action R otherwise. If x and y are distinct nodes such that b x = b y , then the coin is tossed independently at x and y; the outcome at x does not a ect the outcome at y. Given a (generalized) behavior strategy b and a node x in the tree, let p b (yjx) denote the probability of reaching node y starting at node x and using strategy b. Clearly, if there is no path from x to y in ?, we must have p b (yjx) = 0. If there is a path, then p b (yjx) is just the probability of choosing the (unique) sequence of actions that lead from x to y, according to behavior strategy b. Finally, let p b (y) be an abbreviation for p b (yjr), where r is the root of the tree.
A Closer Look at Time Consistency
Roughly speaking, a behavior strategy b is said to be time consistent if, whenever an agent reaches an information set X in the game tree, then the agent does not consider some other strategy b 0 to be better than b, given that he has reached X. As usual, goodness is evaluated in terms of expected utility. However, the agent's subjective utility will depend on his beliefs. In this section, I consider four possible collections of beliefs that the agent may have, that lead to four notions of time consistency.
PR time consistency
In considering whether to switch from b to another strategy at information set X, PR seem to be implicitly assuming that the agent believes the following:
1. some process (external to the game) has picked a unique node x in X where he is reconsidering; he will not reconsider elsewhere, 2. at x, the agent remembers his initial strategy b, 3 . if the agent switches to a new strategy b 0 at x, he will remember b 0 (and may then forget b).
The picture here is that the agent (believes that he) follows strategy b up to some point x 2 X chosen by some process, and then reconsiders at x. If he decides to continue with b, he does so for the rest of the game. If he switches to b 0 , then he uses b 0 for the rest of the game, and remembers that he is using it. 2 Keeping this picture in mind, let us consider the PR notion of time consistency. Suppose the agent is reconsidering at node x in information set X, and has been using strategy b. The agent does not know that he is at x; all he knows is that he is in X. His subjective belief that he is at x will depend on his belief that x is the node that the process chose (recall that Assumption 1 says that the process picks a unique node in X); let b (xjX) denote this subjective probability. Notice that the agent's subjective probability may depend on the strategy b, which is why is subscripted by b, and why it is necessary for the agent to believe that he has been using b up to node x when calculating his belief that he is at x. (This follows from Assumptions 1 and 2.) For each node x in X, it is easy to evaluate the expected utility of a strategy b, starting at x; it is simply EU(b; x) = P z2Z p b (zjx)u(z). Given these assumptions, it is easy to compare the expected utility of sticking with strategy b to that of switching to strategy b 0 , given our assumption that the agent will remember b 0 if he does switch to it (so he can play it even when is in a di erent information set) and will not make any further changes. This leads to PR's de nition of time consistency. The agent's belief b (xjX) that he is at x depends on his beliefs regarding how the node at which he reconsiders is chosen. Although, in principle, the de nition makes sense for any choice of b , I focus here on one particular choice. This choice is generated by a process that chooses a decision node uniformly at random before the game starts. If the agent reaches that node, he gets to reconsider there. Clearly, if there are N decision nodes, the probability that the agent reaches x and gets to reconsider there is p b (x)=N. Thus, if the agent is reconsidering at information set X, then his subjective probability that he is reconsidering at x is b (xjX) = p b (x)= P x 0 2X p b (x 0 ). This is the choice of b that PR focus on in their paper. As pointed out in PR, we can think of this distribution as being determined by the following experiment: \Play the game over and over, using strategy b. As soon as a terminal node is reached, start over again." Then b (xjX) is the expected fraction of times that the agent is at x, given that he is in X. We can also justify these beliefs in terms of a di erent process, which picks a time t in the interval 0; T] uniformly at random, where T is the length of the longest path in the game tree, and lets the agent reconsider at time t if he is still playing the game at that time. It is easy to see that this again gives us b (xjX) = p b (x)= P x 0 2X p b (x 0 ). (This choice of random process is in fact somewhat in the spirit of the discussion in the appendix of Aumann, Hart, and Perry 1997] .)
The assumption that there is some process external to the original game choosing the node at which the agent reconsiders introduces a signi cant new feature to the game. Although the particular process considered here, which chooses among the nodes uniformly at random, seems innocuous, it is not. To see this, consider the game tree described in set. Thus, although nature was equally likely to go left as right, at the information set, the agent believes he is twice as likely to be on the left path as on the right path. If a node is picked at random, it is more likely to be on the longer path. Further discussion of the impact of the way the node is chosen can be found in Grove and Halpern 1997] . The other assumptions that lead to PR time consistency are also quite strong. As was observed in the introduction, the ability to remember the last strategy chosen clearly gives extra information in the game of Figure 2 . As we shall see in Section 4.4, being able to remember the last strategy chosen allows the agent to simulate perfect recall, and thus do better than the optimal strategy of exiting with probability 1=3 in the absentminded driver game. The assumption that the agent believes he will reconsider only once also plays a signi cant role. For example, if the agent believes he may have switched strategies before, then b (xjX) is not the appropriate degree of belief for him to assign to being at x, given that he is in X. In general, the appropriate degree of belief depends on the agent's beliefs regarding what strategy (or strategies) he used to get to node x. 3 Similarly, if the agent believes that he might change strategies in the future, he should not use EU(b 0 ; x) in the expression above, but rather should consider all possible changes to b 0 .
Modi ed multi-self time consistency
PR motivate their notion of modi ed multi-self consistency in terms of the multi-self view of decision making Strotz 1956] , where an \agent" is viewed as a \team", or a collection of \selves", one associated with each information set. Each \self" makes his choice independently. In Strotz's original approach, the selves may also have di erent payo functions; PR consider a variant of this approach where the selves share the same payo function (which makes sense if we think of the selves as members of the same team). Since the agents are independent, a change made by one agent will not be known to the other agents. This can be modeled equivalently (at least as far as time consistency is concerned) by removing the last of the three assumptions characterizing PR time consistency. With this change, all the agent can assume is that he may deviate from his strategy at the current node, but otherwise will follow it.
De nition 3. As shown by PR, optimal strategies are modi ed multi-self consistent. Thus, an agent who starts out using an optimal strategy will not switch to another strategy when reconsidering, given the assumption that the choice of when to reconsider is made by an external choice that chooses a node for reconsideration uniformly at random. However, it is easy to see that a modi ed multi-self consistent strategy is not necessarily optimal. For example, in the simple game (with perfect recall) described in Figure 4 , the strategy of playing L at every node is modi ed multi-self consistent, but not optimal. In retrospect, 3 In games of perfect recall, it is not hard to show that b ( jX ) is actually independent of b. This is not necessarily true for games of imperfect recall, and is one of the many complications that arise in considering such games. 4 This de nition is in the spirit of that of action optimality given in Aumann, Hart, and Perry 1997].
PR's de nition of modi ed multi-self consistency is somewhat di erent. According to their de nition, b is modi ed multi-self consistent if for all actions a 2 A(X) and all actions a 0 2 A(X) such that b X (a 0 ) > 0,
A straightforward argument shows that the two de nitions are equivalent.
Figure 4: A game where an ms time consistent strategy is not optimal.
this observation is not too surprising. As observed by PR, a modi ed multi-self consistent strategy is an equilibrium, in the sense that the team does not gain by any team member unilaterally defecting from the strategy. As this example shows, there may well be equilibrium strategies that are not optimal.
Ms time consistency
In both PR time consistency and modi ed multi-self consistency, the choice of when to reconsider is made according to some process external to the game, which picks a node x in some information set X. Suppose instead we view the reconsideration process as depending only on the information that the agent has. Put another way, this means that the process is not picking a node at which the agent reconsiders; rather, it is picking the information set X at which the agent reconsiders. If the agent reconsiders at one node in X, then he reconsiders at all of them, since reconsideration depends only on his information. This change leads to two further notions of time consistency, called gt (for game tree) time consistency and ms (for multi-self time consistency), which di er in the same way that PR and modi ed multi-self consistency di er, namely, in whether the agent remembers his new strategy.
In this section, I consider ms time consistency. In this case, the agent believes that 1. some process (external to the game) has picked a unique information set X where he is reconsidering; he will not reconsider elsewhere, 2. the agent remembers his initial strategy b.
Because the agent reconsiders at every point in X, if he does deviate from his original strategy b, he ends up following a strategy that may di er from b at X. Since the agent reconsiders only at X, and does not recall the fact that he has switched strategies, his new strategy will agree with b o X. Unlike PR and modi ed multi-self consistency, with ms time consistency, how the information set X at which the agent can reconsider is chosen is irrelevant, just as long as all information sets (at least, all information sets X such that p b (X) > 0) are chosen with positive probability.
De nition The example in Figure 4 shows that the converse may not hold.
How do ms and modi ed multi-self consistency compare? It is easy to see that in games without absentmindedness, the two notions agree. In games with absentmindedness, the two notions may di er. The following technical characterization of modi ed multi-self consistency helps to delineate the di erences.
De nition 3.5: Given a strategy b, an information set X, and two actions a 1 ; a 2 2 A(X), As mentioned earlier, PR show that an optimal strategy is modi ed multi-self consistent. Their proof actually shows much more. Indeed, it shows the following. The converse to Corollary 3.7 does not hold. Consider the modi cation of the absentminded driver example where the payo s at z 1 , z 2 , and z 3 are 1, 0, and 2 respectively, instead of 0, 4, and 1. An easy computation shows that if b is the strategy of not exiting (that is, taking action B) with probability , then EU(b ) = 2 2 ? + 1. Clearly, the optimal strategy is b 1 , never exiting, which gives a payo of 2. In the notation of De nition 3.5, EU(b ) is V B;E ( ). Note that V 0 B;E ( ) = 4 ?1. It follows from Proposition 3.6 that each of b 0 , b 1=4 , and b 1 is modi ed multi-self consistent. On the other hand, since there is only one information set in this game, it follows that b 1 is the only ms time consistent strategy.
To summarize, we have shown that the set of optimal strategies is a subset of the ms time consistent strategies, which is a subset of the modi ed multi-self consistent strategies. In general, the containment is strict.
Gt time consistency
Gt (game tree) time consistency is like PR time consistency in that the agent is assumed to remember his new strategy if he switches strategies and like ms time consistency in that the question of whether the agent reconsiders his strategy depends only on the agent's information. There is one more twist to the de nition of gt time consistency: the agent is assumed to switch strategies only once. Intuitively, the motivation for this is that if the agent switches, then he is switching to his optimal strategy, so there is no need for him to switch again. This intuition is awed: As we shall see in Section 4.4, if the agent can remember that he has switched strategies, then he may be able to do better by not switching immediately to the optimal strategy. Rather, he may want to use the switch as a way of encoding information to allow him to simulate perfect recall. Thus, it is perhaps better to view the restriction that only one switch is allowed as a way to prevent the use of the strategy as an encoding device.
To summarize, gt time consistency makes sense if we assume that the agent believes that 1. some process external to the game has picked a unique information set X where he is reconsidering; he will not reconsider elsewhere, and he will only reconsider once in X, 2. the agent remembers his initial strategy b up to the time that he reconsiders, 3. after reconsidering, if the agent switches to a new strategy b 0 , then he remembers b 0 .
Let the upper frontier of an information set X, denotedX, consist of all those nodes x 2 X such that there is no node x 0 2 X that precedes x on some path from the root. For example, in the absentminded driver game,X e = fe 1 g. It is easy to see that,
given the assumptions of gt time consistency, if the agent switches strategies at all in an information set X, then he does so at the upper frontier of X: Whatever considerations would have led the agent to switch strategies at some node x 2 X would have led him to switch strategies at the (unique) node x 0 2X such that x 0 x. (This is precisely where the assumption that whether the agent switches depends only on his information comes into play.) These considerations lead to the following de nition.
De nition Thus, the di erence between gt time consistency and PR time consistency is the use of X rather than X. How di erent are PR and gt time consistency? As is shown below, they di er only in games that exhibit absentmindedness. These are precisely the games whereX may di er from X. For example, in the absentminded driver game of Figure 1 , let d be the deterministic strategy where the driver never exits, and d 0 the deterministic strategy where he always exits. It is easy to see that d (e 1 ) = d (e 2 ) = 1=2, while d 0 (e 1 ) = 1 and d 0 (e 2 ) = 0. According to the PR de nition, the driver who starts by using strategy d should switch to d 0 at information set X e , since the expected utility of switching to d 0 is 2 (0 1=2 + 4 1=2) while the expected utility of sticking with d is only 1. This is a correct calculation if the choice regarding the node at which reconsideration takes place is made by a random process, that chooses according to d . On the other hand, if we assume that the decision as to whether to switch is based on the information the driver has, then whatever decision the driver makes at e 2 , he knows he would have made the same decision at e 1 . Since the expected utility of switching at e 1 is 0, he should not switch.
In the case of perfect recall, it is well known that a strategy is optimal i it is PR time consistent. In fact, PR prove that this is true in games with perfect recall of information sets, provided that there is no absentmindedness. 5 PR time consistency and gt time consistency coincide in games with no absentmindedness (since X =X for all information sets X in games with no absentmindedness), so in such games, it is also the case that a strategy is optimal i it is gt time consistent. In fact, an even stronger result holds for gt time consistency. Theorem 3.9: If ? is a game of partial recall, then b is optimal i b is gt time consistent.
Proof: See the appendix.
Since the absentminded driver game is one of partial recall, it follows from Theorem 3.9 that the only gt time consistent strategy in that game is the optimal strategy of exiting with probability 1=3. On the other hand, as PR show, the only PR time consistent strategy in that game is to exit with probability 5=9.
Once we move beyond games of partial recall, the optimal strategy may not be gt time consistent. Consider the game in Figure 2 (which is not a game of partial recall). In this game, PR time consistency and gt time consistency coincide, and they do not agree with optimality. At the node x 1 , it is clear that the agent should switch from f to f 0 . He can do better than his optimal strategy by switching. In fact, even in games of partial recall, if the agent can switch strategies, he may be able to do better than his optimal strategy. In particular, the absentminded driver can improve on his optimal strategy if he is allowed to switch strategies (see Section 4.4). What is going on here?
As I observed in the Introduction, an agent who (quite rationally) decides to switch from f to f 0 at node x 1 ends up playing the optimal strategy for the game where x 3 and x 4 are distinguishable: that is, he chooses action B at both x 1 and x 2 , L at x 3 , and R at x 4 . This suggests that the ability to switch strategies at x 1 gives the agent the ability to pass on information that allows him to distinguish x 3 from x 4 . The information sets are simply not capturing the agent's knowledge in this game. This intuition is made precise in the Section 4.1, where an arguably clearer model of the agent's information is presented.
Other notions of time consistency
I have considered four notions of time consistency here. It is clearly possible to de ne others; I brie y mention two.
Battigalli 1995] considers a notion he calls constrained time consistency. Roughly speaking, while modi ed multi-self time consistency allows only deviations at a single node, constrained time consistency also allows deviations at information sets that are irrelevant, in that they are reached with probability 0. Another possibility is to drop the assumption that reconsideration takes place only at one node, or at one information set. This starts to get complicated, since, in general, we must then model the agent's beliefs regarding how likely he is never to switch strategies again, or to switch strategies only once more, and so on. Any particular set of assumptions regarding these issues can, of course, be modeled.
No matter what notion of time consistency we consider, we must carefully model the underlying assumptions. In the next section, I present a framework for doing so.
4 Representing Games as Systems PR and Aumann, Hart, and Perry also discuss the assumptions that underlie their notions of consistency. Their assumptions seem quite di erent from the ones here. In particular, the assumption that the agent believes that he will reconsider only once, which I have argued plays a key role in PR time consistency and modi ed multi-agent time consistency, is not mentioned explicitly in either paper. English is notoriously slippery. Given the ambiguity that we have seen in making sense of time consistency in games with absentmindedness, it becomes particularly important to express these assumptions within the model, not outside it.
Each of the assumptions considered in the previous section can in fact be captured by an appropriate expanded game tree. There is no di culty capturing the assumption that a random process chooses a node or an information set at which the agent gets to reconsider. This just amounts to adding an extra move for nature at the beginning of the game. Capturing the assumption that the agent does or does not remember his strategy is more subtle. Since an information set consists of a set of nodes in the game tree, at best, it can model only what an agent knows about the moves that have been made. Thus, if we want to use an agent's information set to model information about strategies that other agents are using (or information about the strategy the agent herself is using), it is generally necessary to include strategy choices as moves in the game. 6 Information sets are awkward in other contexts too (that do not arise in analyzing time consistency). For example, it is di cult to use information sets to model future moves or, indeed, anything about the future. (As Rubinstein 1991] observes, it is di cult to model considerations such as \I know that if I reach the second intersection I will have doubt of 10% that I am at the rst intersection".) Moreover, traditionally, an agent's information sets consist only of nodes where the agent is about to move. (This is not a universal assumption; for example, it is not made by Rasmusen 1989] .) Nodes where agent 1 does not move are not part of any information set for agent 1. The traditional notion of knowledge says that an agent knows a fact if it is true at all nodes in his information set. This means that we cannot make sense out of statements such as \agent 1 knows that agent 2 knows that agent 1 has moved left", let alone \it is common knowledge that agent 1 has moved left", because a node that is in some information set for agent 1 is not in any of agent 2's information sets. Battigalli and Bonnano 1996] propose one particular approach for making sense of such statements in games of perfect recall, but this is clearly not a general solution to the problem.
So how can we model such considerations? There is no di culty doing so using the standard states-of-the-world approach rst used in the economics literature by Aumann 1976] (which actually is a variant of the standard possible-worlds model for knowledge in the philosophical literature that goes back to Hintikka 1962] ; see Fagin, Halpern, Moses, and Vardi 1995] for discussion). In this approach, each state in a state space is a complete description of the world, which includes what happened in the past and what will happen in the future, the agents' beliefs and knowledge, and so on. The trouble with this approach is that, while it does a good job of capturing an agent's knowledge, it does not do such a good job of describing the play of the game|who moves when, and what the possible moves are. Moreover, because time is not explicit in this approach, it becomes di cult to model statements such as \I know now that after I move my opponent will not know : : : ".
I describe in the next subsection (a slightly simpli ed version of) an approach that goes back to Halpern and Fagin 1989] and can be viewed as combining features of both game trees and the states-of-the-world approach. It has been used quite successfully in dealing with computer science problems Fagin, Halpern, Moses, and Vardi 1995] . In this approach, a game is represented as a multi-agent system. In the description of the system, the actual play of the game is distinguished from what goes on in the agent's mind.
The framework
To describe the agent's state of mind, we assume that, at any point in time, the agent is in some state. Occasionally this is called a local state, to distinguish it from a global state, which is de ned below. The local state is essentially what is called an agent's type in the game theory literature. Intuitively, it encapsulates all the information to which the agent has access. Deciding how to model the state can be quite a nontrivial issue. In a poker game, a player's state might consist of the cards he currently holds, the bets made by the other players, any other cards he has seen, and any information he has about the strategies of the other players. Alternatively, a forgetful player may not remember all the details of the bets made by the other players; his state would re ect this.
To describe the external world, we use an environment, which is also in some state at any point in time. Roughly speaking, the environment's state describes everything relevant to the system that is not part of the agents' states. For example, when describing a game, we can take the environment's state to consist of the sequence of actions that have been taken up to a certain point. If we do this, we can essentially identify the possible environment states with the nodes in the game tree.
The system as a whole can be described by a global state, a tuple of the form (`e;`1; : : : ;`n), where`e is the environment's state, and`i is agent i's state, i = 1; : : : ; n. A global state describes the system at any given point in time. We are typically interested in dynamic systems that change over time. A run is a function from time (which is taken for simplicity to range over the natural numbers) to global states. Intuitively, a run is a complete description of how the system's global state evolves over time. For example, when analyzing a game, a run could be a particular play of a game. Thus, if r is a run, r(0) describes the initial global state of the system, r(1) describes the next global state, and so on. A point is a pair (r; m) consisting of a run r and time m. If r(m) = (`e;`1; : : : ;`n), let r i (m) =`i. Thus, r i (m) is agent i's local state at the point (r; m).
Finally, a system is formally de ned to be a set of runs. Intuitively, a system is being identi ed with its set of possible behaviors. Thus, for example, the game of bridge can be identi ed with all the possible games of bridge that can be played (where a run describes a particular game, by describing the deal of the cards, the bidding, and the play of the hand).
Notice that information sets are conspicuously absent from this de nition. Information sets in fact do not have to be speci ed exogenously; they can be reconstructed from the local states. Given a system, that is, a set R of runs, we can de ne an equivalence relation on the points in R. The point (r; m) is indistinguishable from (r 0 ; m 0 ) by agent i, denoted (r; m) i (r 0 ; m 0 ), if r i (m) = r 0 i (m). Thus, two points are indistinguishable by agent i if agent i has the same local state at each point. Clearly i is an equivalence relation. The i relations can be viewed as de ning information sets. However, note that even a point where agent i does not move is in an information set for agent i.
Actions play an important role in generating systems. Typically we think of them as being generated by a protocol. In Fagin, Halpern, Moses, and Vardi 1995] , there is a notion of a context in which the agents are embedded (i.e., the context in which the game is played), which includes the actions that can be taken. Formally, an action is just a global state transformer, that is, a function from global states to global states. A protocol for an agent in this setting is a function from that agent's local states to a probability distribution over actions. A protocol is the analogue of a strategy, and captures the intuition that what an agent does can depend only on his information. At two points where the agent has the same information, the agent must do the same thing.
Actions do not appear in the formal de nition of a system. Nevertheless, they often do appear (either implicitly or explicitly) in the global state of the system. That is because we typically think of the runs of the system as being generated by the agents and the environment performing some actions. For example, in modeling the game of bridge, we may well put actions such as bidding into the global state. If the agent knows what action was taken, it would be encoded in his local state. Otherwise, we can encode it in the environment's state if the action is considered relevant to the description of the system. Thus, we can ensure that the actions appear in the global state whenever they are relevant to the description of the system. 7 Given a protocol and a set of initial global states, we can construct a computation tree for that protocol. The successors of a given global state in the tree are the results of actions that can be taken according to the protocol. Each transition has a probability, according to the probability assigned by the protocol to the action corresponding to that transition. The paths in the tree become the runs of the system, and (given a distribution on initial states) we can put a distribution on the runs in the system in the obvious way. Rather than going through all the formal de nitions here (they can be found in Fagin, Halpern, Moses, and Vardi 1995; Halpern and Tuttle 1993] ), I shall Section 2, de ne exp 00 (r; m) to be the sequence of local states that the agent has gone through, with consecutive repetitions omitted. An agent is said to exhibit perfect recall if, whenever (r 0 ; m 0 ) i (r; m), then exp 00 (r; m) = exp 00 (r 0 ; m 0 ). Intuitively, this de nition of perfect recall says that the agent remembers everything he ever knew. It does not say that he remembers everything he ever did. He may not remember his actions if his actions were not encoded in his local state to begin with. The reason that consecutive repetitions are omitted is that if an agent has the same local state at a sequence of consecutive states, this just means that time has passed without the agent being aware of it (or of anything else that may have happened, including actions that he has performed). Again, this is not counted against the agent having perfect recall of everything he knew.
focus on some examples of applying these ideas to modeling games.
From game trees to systems
When modeling a game, we must rst decide how to model the states of the agent and the environment. Of course, there are many ways to do this. Here is one approach that should be useful for many games of interest: Given a game ?, it is typically useful to let the environment state encode (among other things) the current node in the game (or, equivalently, the sequence of actions taken to reach that node). Thus, I assume that environment states have the form (x; : : :), where x 2 ?. The \: : :" includes whatever else might be relevant to the system; we shall see some examples shortly. Similarly, it is typically useful to let the agent's state encode (among other things), what nodes the agent considers possible. Thus, I assume that the agent's local state has the form (X; : : :), where X is a set of nodes in the tree (intuitively, this is the set of nodes that the agent considers possible) and, again, the \: : : " incorporates whatever other relevant information the agent may have (for example, about his protocol, or protocols that other agents may be using). Although for some applications it may be useful to take X to be an arbitrary set of nodes, here, for simplicity, I further assume that in a global state of the form ((x; : : :); (X; : : :)), if x 2 D, then X is the information set containing x.
Just as we associate a set of allowed actions A(x) with each node x in the tree, we associate a set of allowed actions A(g) with each global state g. Actually, it is convenient to take A(g) to be a set of allowed probability distributions over actions. By being able to stipulate that only certain distributions over actions are allowed, we can capture cleanly nature's moves, as well as certain constraints on the agents' moves. Suppose g has the form ((x; : : :);`); then A(g) depends on whether x is in D, C, or Z.
If x 2 D, we could identify A(g) with all possible distributions on the actions in A(x). However, as we shall see, it is sometimes useful to allow more constraints to be imposed, and to allow more general actions. For example, if the agent's local state includes his strategy, then we may want A(g) to consist only of the distribution on A(x) that is determined by the strategy. On the other hand, if the agent can switch strategies, then we may have distributions over actions that can both change the node in the tree and change the agent's strategy. Thus, we assume that the elements in A((x; : : :);`) are distributions over actions of the form (: : : ; a), where a 2 A(x). The \: : : " in (: : : ; a) allows for a general action that may, for example, result in the agent changing his strategy, as well as changing the node in the tree. After performing action (: : : ; a), the global state becomes ((a(x); : : :);`0), for some appropriate local state`0. I further assume that A((x; : : :);`) depends only on the agent's local state`, so that A((x; : : :);`) = A((x 0 ; : : :);`) if x; x 0 2 D. This is the analogue of the assumption that the agent's set of possible actions must be the same at all nodes in the same information set. If x 2 C, then A((x; : : :);`) consists of a single distribution over the possible transitions at node x, as de ned by the game tree. More precisely, assume that k is the outdegree of the node x in the game tree. Associate an action c j , j = 1; : : : ; k, with each of the edges leading out from x. Performing action c j in ((x; : : :);`) results in a global state of the form ((c j (x); : : :);`0), where c j (x) is the jth successor of x in the tree, in some xed ordering of x's successors. If the transition to c j (x) has probability p j , then A((x; : : :);`) consists of the unique distribution over c 1 ; : : : ; c k that gives c j probability p j . If x 2 Z, then A((x; : : :);`) = ;; no actions are possible at terminal nodes. A context is a triple (G; G 0 ; A) consisting of a set G of global states as above, a subset G 0 of G of initial states, and a function A associating with each global state g 2 G a set A(g) of allowed distributions over actions. Given a protocol , we say that a run r is consistent with in context (G; G 0 ; A) if (a) r(0) 2 G 0 (so that the initial state is a legal initial state), and (b) r(m) = ((x; : : :);`), then (i) if x 2 D, then r(m + 1) = a(r(m)) for some a such that (`) gives a positive probability, (ii) if x 2 C, then r(m + 1) = c(r(m)) for some action c corresponding to a transition out of x in the tree, (iii) if x 2 Z, then r(m + 1) = r(m). 8 The system generated by (in context (G; G 0 ; A)) consists of all the runs consistent with . Given a distribution on the global states in G 0 , we can get a distribution on the runs in the system generated by in a straightforward way, and thus compute the expected utility of protocol .
Modeling time consistency
Given a game ?, I now construct four contexts corresponding to the game, one for each of the four notions of time consistency considered in Section 3. These systems attempt to capture formally the assumptions underlying the four notions.
The environment state is used to capture when reconsideration takes place. Thus, I take the environment state to have the form (x; Y; b), where x is a node in the tree, Y D, and b is a strategy. Intuitively, x is the current node in the tree, Y is the set of nodes where reconsideration takes place (if a node in Y is reached in the game), and b is the agent's initial strategy. For PR time consistency and modi ed multi-self consistency, Y is always a singleton; for ms and gt time consistency, Y is an information set. 9 The agent's local state has the form (X; b; t), where X is a set of nodes in the tree, b is a strategy, and t is either 0 or 1, depending on whether the agent reconsiders his strategy at that state. Note that the local state makes the fact that the agent knows his strategy explicit, by making the strategy part of the local state. 2 D is unimportant for the current discussion; any xed choice will do. For de niteness, I take X = fxg in this case.
Next we must de ne the allowed actions. This is where PR and gt time consistency di ers from ms and modi ed multi-self consistency. In the case of PR and gt, the agent remembers his new strategy if he chooses to switch strategies; this fact must be encoded in his local state. In the case of ms and modi ed multi-self consistency, the agent does not remember the change. Thus, I consider two possible sets of distributions on actions, denoted A 1 and A 2 , depending on which notion of consistency is being considered. Although the use of the uniform distribution is crucial in parts (a) and (b) of the theorem, any distribution that assigns positive probability to all the initial states su ces for parts (c) and (d). This result stresses the role of the uniform distribution in PR and modi ed multi-self time consistency. As I observed earlier, the use of the uniform distribution is far from innocuous here.
The fact that the agent performs the same action whenever he deviates in an information set X follows from the fact that we are using a protocol and the agent's local state is the same at all the global states in X where he deviates.
The assumptions underlying all the notions of time consistency are all of the form \The agent believes : : : ". In the systems constructed here, these beliefs become knowledge, in the sense that they are true at all the points the agent considers possible. Thus, these systems can be viewed as encoding the agent's beliefs. Although these systems could be embedded in systems where the agent's beliefs might be false, nothing in the analysis would change if this were done. It is worth stressing that, in any case, the use of local states makes the agent's beliefs explicit.
There is no di culty in nding systems corresponding to the notion of constrained time consistency and the other notions alluded to in Section 3.5, and proving a result analogous to Theorem 4.1 for them.
The e ect of being able to recall strategies
To capture all the notions of time consistency considered here, I assumed that the agent (believes that he) remembers his initial strategy up to the point that he reconsiders. 11 In addition, one of the assumptions underlying PR time consistency (and gt time consistency) is that the agent remembers his new strategy if he reconsiders and changes. As the game in Figure 2 illustrates, the latter assumption is very powerful; it can allow us to simulate perfect recall. As I now show, if we drop the assumption made in PR and gt time consistency that the agent reconsiders only once, and allow the agent to reconsider arbitrarily often and remember the most recent strategy used, then we can come arbitrarily close to simulating perfect recall in any game. Intuitively, the ability to remember the most recent strategy used gives the agent a signi cant amount of encoding power.
One advantage of the framework presented here is that the distinction between strategies and protocols allows us to make precise the intuition that the agent is using a protocol that makes use of his ability the remember the most recent strategy used. Given a game ?, let G ? consist of all global states of the form (x; (X; b)), where x is a node in the tree, X is the information set containing x if x 2 D, and fxg otherwise, and b is a strategy.
(The environment state no longer has a set Y where the agent reconsiders, since the agent can always reconsider; for similar reasons, there is no need to encode the agent's original strategy in the environment state, nor is there a need for the bit t in the agent's local state.) At a global state (x; (X; b)), the agent can perform any action of the form (b 0 ; a), where b 0 is a strategy and a is given positive probability according to b x . Performing With this setup, consider the absentminded driver example. Let b be the strategy where the driver continues (i.e., does not exit) with probability . Suppose the driver uses the following protocol: If his local state is (X e ; b ), 6 = 1, he performs the action (b 1 ; B). That is, he switches to the strategy of always playing B and performs action B (the only one allowed according to this strategy). On the other hand, if his state is (X e ; b 1 ), he performs the action (b 0 ; E). That is, he switches to strategy b 0 and performs action E (again, the only choice). Unless he starts with initial state (X e ; b 1 ), this protocol is guaranteed to get him home, with payo 4, just as if he had perfect recall. Essentially what is going on here is that, as long as the driver does not start with strategy b 1 , then the driver always knows exactly where he is: at node e 1 , he knows he is at node e 1 (from the fact that his current strategy is not b 1 ), and at node e 2 , he knows he is at node e 2 (from the fact that his current strategy is b 1 ). This is also what is going on in the analysis of the game in Figure 2 .
This situation essentially holds in general.
To make this precise, we need a few de nitions. Given a game ?, let ? pr be the game that is identical to ? except for the agent's information sets. These are given as the coarsest re nement of his information sets in ? that gives him perfect recall. Of course, if ? is a game where the agent has perfect recall, then ? pr = ?.
An information set X in a game ? is nontrivial if there are at least two actions in A(X). Let g b be the unique global state (x; (X; b)) such that x is the root of ?. The proof of Theorem 4.2 just generalizes the arguments given earlier for the absentminded driver example. The ability to recall the last strategy used gives the agent encoding power su cient to simulate perfect recall. This theorem is not terribly interesting insofar as telling us how games should be played. However, it does show the power of the assumption of being able to switch strategies while still recalling the last strategy used. 12 12 In Halpern 1995], a variant of this result is proved: Roughly speaking, de ne a level-0 protocol to be a strategy, and a level-(k +1) protocol to be one which allows changes in level-k protocols. It is shown that, for a su ciently large k, there is a level-k protocol that simulates the optimal protocol in ? pr . Under the assumptions of part (a) of Theorem 4.2, we can take k = 1, so the two results coincide in this case. Under the assumptions of part (b) of Theorem 4.2, we may have k > 1, but the k-level protocol is deterministic.
On the other hand, if we assume that the agent can remember his initial strategy, is it so unreasonable to assume that he can also remember his later choices? Perhaps it might be more reasonable to assume that the agent can remember neither his initial choice nor his later choices. This would truly correspond to absentmindedness. However, if we do not assume that the agent can recall his initial choice, then none of the notions of time consistency considered in the literature seem appropriate. Ambrus-Lakatos 1995] introduced what he called extended strategies|which are essentially protocols where the local state encodes the previous strategy used, and the agent has actions which allow him to switch strategy|and used them to as a tool to investigate strategy recall in games of imperfect recall. Notice that the notion of protocol used here is far more general than his notion of extended strategy, since the local state can do much more than just encode the previous strategy used. Ambrus-Lakatos independently proved a theorem similar in spirit to Theorem 4. 2. 13 5 Discussion
What should we make of the various de nitions of time consistency? How reasonable are they? That depends on how appropriate the underlying assumptions are; this is up to the modeler to decide. However, the results of the earlier sections shed some light on the impact of the various choices.
The results of Section 4.3 make it clear that the various notions of time consistency involve playing a game di erent from the original game. This \reconsideration" game involves assuming that the agent remembers the last strategy he chose (in the case of PR and gt time consistency) and some assumptions about when the agent is able to reconsider. In the case of PR time consistency and modi ed multi-self consistency, the reconsideration game is quite sensitive to the nature of the process that chooses where reconsideration may occur. Here I have focused on the process that may be characterized as choosing the node where reconsideration occurs uniformly at random among all the decision nodes; this process leads to the same subjective beliefs b as considered by PR and Aumann, Hart, and Perry. As the game in Figure 2 and the modi cation of the absentminded driver game considered in Section 3.3 show, this choice results in reconsideration games for which the optimal strategy may be di erent from that of the original game, and may even result in a higher payo . 14 Only in the case of ms consistency are the optimal strategies in the reconsideration game the same as the optimal strategies in the original game.
It should not be surprising that changing the game may result in possibly di erent
behavior. Perhaps what makes these observations surprising is that in the case of perfect recall, all the reconsideration games are in fact equivalent to the original game. The other moral that should come out of these results is the importance of carefully modeling what is going on. In principle, (the games corresponding to) all the notions of time consistency could have been modeled using (rather complicated) game trees. However, it is not clear that they would have been the best tool. To quote Myerson 1991] , \the general form or structure of the models we use to describe games must be carefully considered. A model structure that is too simple may force us to ignore vital aspects of the real games we want to study." It is all too easy, using game trees, to draw information sets without thinking about whether they really are appropriate representations of an agent's knowledge. Typically, issues such as what an agent knows about his strategy are not modeled by information sets.
In the systems framework I have described here, an agent's information is described explicitly at each point in time by his local state, and his behavior is described by means of a protocol, a function from local states to actions. The framework forces on the modeler the discipline of making clear exactly what an agent knows at any time. Thus, it allows a modeler to make an independent argument as to when a game tree is an adequate representation of an agent's knowledge.
That leads to an obvious question: Just when is the standard game tree model adequate? The pat answer is that it is adequate when the information set is an adequate description of the agent's information and we do not want to allow actions that can modify the agent's state as well as the environment. In general, adequacy depends on what we are trying to analyze. Clearly the game tree model is perfectly adequate for many analyses involving games of perfect recall, otherwise it would not have survived so long. On the other hand, PR's examples show that when it comes to analyzing time consistency in games of imperfect recall, information sets are inadequate. The di culty of using game trees to analyze games of imperfect recall may be one reason that they have received relatively little attention in the game theory literature. (By way of contrast, games of imperfect recall are the norm in the computer science literature. Note that any game played by nite automata that is su ciently long (in particular, that goes on for more steps than the automata have local states), will be a game of imperfect recall, indeed, one that exhibits absentmindedness. Thus, games of imperfect recall arise quite often in practice.) Even in games of perfect recall, game trees cannot be used easily to represent information that players have about other players' strategies. I believe the systems representation could prove useful here as well, especially when it comes to analyzing issues of rationality. I hope to return to this issue in future work.
Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to go into extensive discussion about the systems approach to modeling games, it has some other advantages that are worth pointing out.
There is no need to assume that agents move sequentially. An \action" may well consist of a tuple of actions, one for each of the agents. (Indeed, this is pre-cisely what is assumed in the more general framework presented in Fagin, Halpern, Moses, and Vardi 1995] .) For example, if we are considering prisoners' dilemma, where a prisoner may either cooperate (C) or defect (D), and we view these actions as happening simultaneously, then the allowed actions could be (C; C), (C; D), (D; C), or (D; D). Using standard semantics of knowledge Fagin, Halpern, Moses, and Vardi 1995] , there is no di culty in this model of making sense out of one agent knowing that another agent knows something, or there being common knowledge, at any point in the system. I have largely ignored the question here of how an agent should assign probabilities to events in systems. This issue is discussed and formalized in some detail in Halpern and Tuttle 1993] , at least for systems that correspond to games with perfect recall. (The philosophical issues of what is an \appropriate" distribution in systems corresponding to games of imperfect recall is also brie y discussed.) In any case, once we associate with each agent a probability distribution that characterizes his beliefs, there is no di culty in making sense out of statements such as \I know now that if I reach the second intersection, I will place probability 1=10 on being at the rst intersection".
There is no di culty capturing the multiself approach in this framework. Each \self" just becomes another agent.
Of course, given a systems representation of a nite game, it can be viewed as a collection of game trees. By adding a dummy root node, we get a single game tree back. Thus, at some level, it can be argued that the standard game tree model can deal with all the issues I have raised (once we allow an agent's information sets to form a partition of all the nodes in a game tree, not just the nodes where the agent moves). As I tried to suggest earlier, this does not always seem to be the best way of looking at things. There are times when it seems useful to distinguish the external game from what is going on in the agent's head. For such situations, the systems representation can be a useful addition to a modeler's arsenal. To back up this argument requires further examples, especially ones showing that the system approach really helps in the analysis of games. This too is something I hope to explore further.
A Appendix: Proofs
In this section, I prove the results stated in Sections 3 and 4. The results are restated here for the reader's convenience.
To prove Theorem 3.9, the following characterization of gt time consistency is useful.
(a) If ? is a game with at least two nontrivial information sets, or if ? has only one nontrivial information set, but no path in ? has more than two nodes in that information set, then there is a deterministic protocol and a strategy b such that Choose b such that b is not N-special for any N. Fix . I leave it to the reader to check that we can choose N su ciently large so that N approximates b su ciently well so as to make the expected utility of N in context (G ? ; fg b g; A ? ) be within of that of b .
